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Abstract 
The European Union membership process has had an impact on 
Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy.  However, when compared with 
previous candidate countries to the EU, the Europeanization of politics in 
Turkey has not been an even process.  The reformation of politics in Turkey 
has had three main characteristics. First, instead of the pace of the reforms 
being linear, there has been a periodic rise and fall of interest in introducing 
amendments.  Second, the reforms have not necessarily replaced past 
practices, rather they have only introduced new ones in addition to the old 
ways of doing politics.  Finally, there has been considerable opposition to the 
reforms in Turkey, partially because the government does not seem to follow 
the liberal-democratic trajectory set out by the EU membership process.  The 
delays in enacting the constitutional and legal changes and the biased 
selection of laws and practices that are being amended do not give the 
impression that the government is sincere.  Whether the amendments are in 
fact Europeanizing Turkey or pulling it away from its Western and secular 
political framework is a significant question leading to conflict among 
different factions in society.  This divergence of opinion, in turn, results in 
further stalling the reforms. 
                                                 
* Yaprak Gürsoy is an Assistant Professor at Istanbul Bilgi University, 
Department of International Relations and a fellow at the European Institute.  She 
received her PhD from the University of Virginia, Department of Politics.  Her 
dissertation is a comparative study of Greek and Turkish political regimes, civil-
military relations, and businessmen's political attitudes.  For her dissertation, Dr. 
Gürsoy conducted more than 100 interviews with Greek and Turkish military officers, 
politicians, and businessmen.  Her articles on regime change, democratization and 
civil-military relations have been published in the EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY, 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY SOCIOLOGY, JOURNAL OF MODERN GREEK 
Studies, and TURKISH STUDIES. 
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The enlargement of the European Union (EU) has led to democratic 
reforms in the constitutions, legal frameworks, practices and norms of 
candidate countries. The effects of EU candidacy and membership were first 
evidenced – and most significantly demonstrated – in the political and 
economic transformation of former Eastern bloc states.  Since the 2004 
Eastern enlargement of the EU, implementing the EU acquis communaitaire 
has been increasingly seen as a mechanism that leads to the Europeanization 
of candidate countries.  Membership in the EU requires the adoption of the 
Copenhagen political criteria on democracy, rule of law, human rights, and 
respect for and protection of minorities.  As a result, states that wish to join 
the EU are obligated to Europeanize their politics and accept the basic tenants 
of liberal democracy. 
Even though Turkey has lagged behind Eastern European countries in 
terms of EU membership, the transformation of Turkish politics has been 
equally important.  From 1999, when Turkey became an official candidate 
country, to 2005, when accession negotiations began, the Turkish parliament 
ratified nine harmonization packages and amended around one-third of the 
original text of Turkey’s 1982 Constitution and its Penal and Civil Codes.  
Turkey has gone through a reform process not only in these legal texts but 
also in the norms and practices of domestic and foreign politics.  Thus, 
looking at the amount of changes, it is possible to argue that Turkey is 
increasingly being Europeanized.  
However, Europeanization of Turkish politics has not been a smooth 
process, which makes it possible to question whether it is in fact real or 
imagined. We can identify three interrelated characteristics or problems with 
Europeanization in Turkish politics.  The first characteristic is that the reform 
process has been moving in tides, where there is almost a periodic rise and fall 
of interest in introducing reforms. Second, the new laws do not necessarily 
lead to changes in practice, but merely add new layers of doing politics.  
Finally, support for the reforms has been precarious, partially because of the 
first two problems, that is, delays in introducing amendments and the duality 
of politics where old practices survive the new adjustments.  The conflict 
among various political groups on the meaning of the reforms and their 
significance for Turkey’s future leads to a vicious circle, where 
Europeanization slowly moves ahead on a bumpy road with unexpected 
curves and U-turns.   
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Reform Tides 
The reform process in Turkey moves in waves, rather than in a linear, 
continuous fashion.  When two positive steps are made forward, usually one 
step backwards follows.  The overall course of the reforms resembles this 
pattern.  The majority of constitutional amendments were made between 1999 
and 2004, but no major changes were introduced for almost 5 years 
afterwards.  In 2010, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government 
has shown more enthusiasm and enacted a package which would change 
around 20 articles in the constitution.  The government also started to refer to 
a “democratic opening,” which would introduce more rights and freedoms to 
minorities.  
Minority cultural rights, in particular Kurdish language rights, are 
good examples that demonstrate how interest in the reform process moves in 
tides.  Several amendments introduced during the first wave of reform 
between 1999 and 2004, introduced changes in broadcasting and education in 
languages other than Turkish, including Kurdish.  The state-directed Turkish 
Radio and Television and local private channels started to air Kurdish-
language programs.  But a few years later, the local channels were either 
closed down or court cases were opened up against them. Similarly, even 
though Kurdish education in private schools was possible, all such courses 
were closed down in 2004.  Moreover, minority language rights did not 
extend to public services, as evidenced by the June 2007 decision of the 
Council of State to close down the municipality council for using Kurdish.   
Yet, these backlashes were somewhat reversed again, when in 
January 2009 the government launched a new TV station that would broadcast 
only in the Kurdish language.  This move was followed by the 2010 
“democratic opening” initiative of the JDP government, which entailed 
economic reform in the east (where Turkey’s Kurdish citizens are mostly 
located), more language rights, the establishment of departments of 
Kurdologie in universities, a pardon to some Kurdish leaders, and the 
abolishment of some security measures.  Despite the broad scope of the 
initiative, as of August 2010 there no major amendments have been 
introduced.  Thus, minority and cultural rights demonstrate that 
Europeanization of Turkish politics does not take place in a linear upwards 
and forwards fashion, but occurs in periodic ascents and descents. 
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Reforms and Pockets of Old Politics   
The second related characteristic of Europeanization in Turkish 
politics is that new reforms do not necessarily eliminate past practices, but 
merely introduce new ones on top of old ways of doing politics.  Article 301 
of the Turkish criminal code is a good example.  This article prohibited 
expressions that insulted “Turkishness.”  On the bases of this article, several 
well-known figures, including Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk, were 
prosecuted.  Despite significant pressure from the European Union, this article 
was not amended until April 2008, and when it was finally amended, the basic 
principles of the article were kept in tact.  The term “Turkishness” was 
specified as the Turkish nation, state, and parliament. Additionally, the article 
was revised so that the right to open an investigation would be in the hands of 
the Ministry of Justice.  These changes, however, are quite unsatisfactory 
since the article is still contrary to freedom of speech and contains 
nationalistic undertones.  Besides, by introducing the new requirement of 
getting permission from the Ministry of Justice for a criminal investigation, 
the new article risks politicizing freedom of speech. 
Changes in foreign policy are another example which shows that 
amendments run parallel to past practices.  In the 1990s, Turkey pursued its 
foreign policy goals by mostly using coercive strategies against external 
threats.  Turkey’s neighbors, including Greece (a NATO ally), Iran, Syria, and 
Iraq, were perceived as security threats, which necessitated unilateral hard-
line tools.  Such realist principles were against European norms and practices 
that are based on multilateralism and use of diplomatic and economic 
instruments in resolving international problems and disputes.  
With the EU accession process after 1999, Turkish foreign policy also 
started to change, bringing it more in line with European norms.  The Justice 
and Development Party government describes the new foreign policy as “a 
zero problems with neighbors policy.” The policy aims at building trust, and 
economic and political cooperation between Turkey and its neighbors.  
Reflecting this change, Greece and Turkey initiated a new rapprochement and 
increased dialogue between government officials and civil society groups.  
Turkey started to engage in economic activities, trade, and investment with its 
Middle Eastern neighbors.  Political dialogue and diplomatic interactions 
improved with Syria, Iran, the central government in Baghdad, and the 
regional Kurdish government in northern Iraq.  There have been frequent high 
profile visits between officials in Ankara and the presidents, prime ministers, 
and technical delegations of these nations, which would have been quite 
unthinkable just a decade ago.  
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Even though Turkey has introduced economic and diplomatic tactics 
to its foreign policy with its neighbors, this does not mean that military tactics 
were completely abandoned.  Typical with the way Europeanization moves 
forward in Turkish politics, new measures were introduced on top of old 
practices. Turkey still employs military measures against some groups, 
particularly against northern Iraq, where most of the cells of the Kurdish 
terrorist organization, PKK, are located.  In October 2003, the Turkish 
Parliament authorized the military to carry out operations in northern Iraq.  
This authorization was renewed several times, the last one being in October 
2009.  Since fall 2007, the Turkish military has attacked PKK bases across the 
border.  Thus, even though new elements have been introduced in Turkish 
foreign policy, old ones (meaning military and other coercive options) have 
not been completely eliminated, at least as relations with Iraq demonstrate.  
Relations with Israel and Iran also raise questions on the extent of 
Europeanization in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey, along with Brazil, 
negotiated a deal with Tehran to exchange low enriched uranium with nuclear 
fuel that would be used in Iran only for peaceful purposes.  The deal, 
however, was not realized when the UN did not support the plan and the 
Security Council decided to apply additional sanctions on Iran in June 2010.  
The only two Council members that voted against the decision were Brazil 
and Turkey.  Even though it might seem that Turkey provides unwavering 
support to diplomatic solutions with Iran, such close relations with a rogue 
state that has a fundamentalist Islamic regime leads to concerns that secular 
Turkey is moving away from the West.  
Thorny relations with Israel, especially since the January 2009 public 
row between Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and President Shimon Peres at 
the World Economic Forum in Davos, raise similar concerns.  In the 1990s, 
Israel and Turkey cooperated politically and militarily against their Middle 
Eastern neighbors. However, after the Islamist JDP won the elections in 2002 
and amended relations with Iran, Syria and Iraq, the need to cooperate with 
Israel waned.  The government started to use Islamist rhetoric against Israel’s 
policy in Palestine.  The relations between the two countries reached an all 
time low in May 2010 when Israel attacked a flotilla carrying humanitarian 
aid to Gaza and killed Turkish citizens on board. Turkey took the matter to the 
UN Security Council and demanded an independent investigation of the 
event.  The way that Turkey attempted to deal with the debacle demonstrates 
the continued use of diplomatic and multilateral solutions.  However, 
deteriorating relations with Israel also allude to the double-faced reform 
process. While on the one hand the government is pursing “zero problems 
with neighbors,” on the other hand, it is creating new “villains” in foreign 
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policy and adopting hostile rhetoric.  Thus, both in domestic and foreign 
policy, new policies and legal changes do not necessarily replace old 
practices. 
Support for the Reforms 
A final, and perhaps most important characteristic, of 
Europeanization of Turkish politics is that not all political leaders support the 
process whole-heartedly. So far, reforms have been carried out mostly by the 
Islamist Justice and Development party governments.  Secular and nationalist 
critiques of the JDP are opposed to the reform process and their criticisms can 
be grouped in two interrelated categories. 
First are those nationalist actors, who, in general, oppose the reform 
process carried out for membership in the European Union.  For the 
opposition Republican People’s Party and the National Action Party, the 
prospects for Turkey becoming an EU member are dim because of the 
negative attitudes of the Europeans.  Increasing anti-Turkish discourse in 
some European capitals dampens hope that one day Turkey will also join the 
EU – even if it adopts the acqui and the Copenhagen criteria fully. Proposals 
in EU member states to hold national referenda for Turkish membership or to 
grant special status (instead of full integration) to Turkey leads to suspicions 
about the true motives of EU members.  Nationalist groups question why 
Turkey is trying to change if there is no light at the end of the tunnel.  
Reforms are seen as concessions to foreign powers and threats to national 
sovereignty and independence.  As the EU demands more liberal and 
democratic rights for minorities without any prospect of membership, Turkish 
nationalists claim that the unity of the Turkish state is being jeopardized.  
Simply put, there are no incentives for reform and no way to weaken the 
power of nationalists when there is no carrot of EU membership.  
Second, critiques of the reform process come from groups that 
question the intentions of the JDP.  Are these reforms carried out because 
Turkey is really trying to adapt to the EU acqui and democratize its system?  
Or are these reforms merely a means to a specific end, such as undermining 
secularism in Turkish politics?  The opposition Republican People’s Party and 
the National Action Party, as well as secular state elites, such as members of 
the judiciary and military, believe that the government stalls the reform 
process and selects which policies to amend because the true aim of the JDP 
is not Europeanization or Westernization.  In domestic politics, the 
government revised several laws and changed the constitution so that the 
political autonomy of the military would be reduced.  The JDP also made 
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attempts to change the structure of the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors and functions of the Constitutional Court.   
Both the military and the judiciary in Turkey are guardians of 
secularism, and while efforts to decrease their roles in politics can be a sign of 
further democratization, they can also be read as attacks against the separation 
of religion from state affairs.  Similarly, in foreign policy, close association 
with Muslim nations, such as Iran and Syria, and thorny relations with old 
allies, such as Israel, can be interpreted as either having good relations with 
neighbors or as the hypocrisy of the reform process. Overall, the reform 
process might mean Islamization of Turkish politics and a move away from 
the West, instead of exactly the opposite: Europeanization.   
These two interpretations of Turkish legal and constitutional reforms 
lead to a split and polarization among political leaders, forming the bases of 
the problems in Turkey’s Europeanization.  The groups that oppose the JDP 
and criticize the way that Turkey’s EU bid and reforms are moving forward 
point to the first two characteristics of Europeanization, namely the 
backlashes and the remaining pockets of old politics, as evidence of the 
insincerity of the government.  But their resistance to the reforms is also an 
explanation of why Turkey has problems with Europeanization.  Indeed, 
Turkey is caught in a vicious circle.  The JDP does not attempt sweeping 
changes and does not carry out reforms one after the other because that would 
increase suspicions and increase resistance.  Instead, the government moves 
ahead slowly and sometimes even reverses its prior reforms (such as those 
focused on minority rights) when nationalist opposition appears to gain 
power.  The government also selects what it deems as the most urgent 
reforms, calculating of course how its own Islamist constituency would react.   
So far, reforms that would eliminate opposition in the military and the 
judiciary are among the first choices of amendments.  However, instead of 
alleviating concerns, these policies increase negative reactions even further 
and subject the government to fierce criticism.  This is how Turkey finds itself 
at the beginning of the vicious circle and how foot-dragging on reform 
continues. 
Conclusion 
Is Europeanization of Turkish politics a reality?  If we take 
Europeanization as reforming Turkish politics in accordance with EU 
institutional rules, norms, and practices, then definitely some important 
changes are taking place, even though they are far from being smooth.  Yet, 
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Europeanization is a myth if the intentions of the reforming JDP government 
are not necessarily to democratize the regime.  It is also a myth if important 
segments of the Turkish political and state elite continue to resist the reform 
process and wait for the opportunity to reverse and undermine it, especially in 
practice, either by pressuring the government or when and if they gain enough 
votes to take over the government.  
It seems that the only hope that would get Turkey out of the loop is an 
exogenous factor.  This is why the attitudes of the European leaders are 
critical.  If the EU and the member states can assure Turkey that it will 
become a member after it successfully carries out necessary reforms, the 
secular opposition will believe that the irreversibility of democracy, 
secularism, and Western-orientation of Turkey is guaranteed.  This is the only 
way that the reforms will truly mean Europeanization for all the actors 
involved. 
